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Abstract: Existential threats, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have historically
engendered intellectual paradigm shifts, and even systemic transformations in the
economy and polity. This paper focuses on two inter-related phenomena: rising
economic inequality and the diminution of liberal democracy, a feature common to
both developed and developing countries set in the context of a ubiquitous and
globalized capitalism. In the post-pandemicworld, we need to harness the positive
dimensions of the powerful capitalist system to lower inequality and build a newer
world akin to an earlier golden age of capitalism.
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The COVID-19 pandemic is a truly stupendous human tragedy, not only due to the
mortality it is causing, but also because the greatest global recession since the
1930s may be about to ensue, and the unprecedented scale of the disruption to
movements of people, goods and services. The consequence is the immiserization
of vast swathes of humanity, particularly endangering the lives and livelihoods of
the marginalized and vulnerable across the globe. Such existential threats have
historically engendered an intellectual climacteric, and occasionally, gradual
systemic change. Whether such behavioural and mind-set alterations do actually
materialize in the future is a matter for history, however, there is no dearth of
opinions about how the present crisis should be managed, and what the ideal
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complexion of the world that follows, should be.1 This paper focuses on two inter-
related phenomena: rising economic inequality and the diminution of liberal de-
mocracy, a feature common to both developed and developing countries, set in the
context of a ubiquitous and globalized capitalism, which, as a system, has tri-
umphed over all alternatives.
1 Pandemics in History
Earlier pandemics have produced or set in train transformations in the sense of
Polyani (1944). The Black Death (magna pestilencia) of circa 1348–50, heralded the
demise of the feudal economic system (Scheidel 2017; Routt 2008), a processwhich
was to last three centuries, ending with the cataclysmic 30 Years War of 1618–48
(Hobsbawm 1954). The decimation of the population following the Black Death
made landmore abundant relative to labour, increasing thewage-rental ratio. This
had the impact of lowering inequality, a tendencymoderated by the falling price of
grain in the late 14th century. It also altered the composition of output, leading to
less grain production, increased animal husbandry, and the pattern of Europe-
wide trade in woolen products, halting the hitherto flourishing Silk Route trade
(Routt 2008). There was also political turmoil, with peasant revolts in Belgium
prior to the Black Death, in England in 1381, and in Germany in the early 16th
century (Scheidel 2017). These may have had some levelling effects. The feudal
system, however, lingered till the endof the 30YearsWar (Hobsbawm1954), which
also produced intermittent epidemics. Hobsbawm (1954) characterized the 17th
century as a period of crisis in Europe. The conclusion of that catastrophe radically
altered the global economic system inmanyways, chief ofwhichwas the decline of
Venetian Mediterranean trade. Citing detailed evidence from the devastated
German city of Augsburg, Scheidel (2017) outlines the “equalizing” consequences
of physical devastation, particularly through the proscription of the richest seg-
ments of society. The impact of the 30 Years war and the plague epidemics of the
17th century are also discussed by Caruso (2020).
Voigtländer and Voth (2013) point to wars and war-related epidemics from the
Black Death up to the 18th century arguing that the decrease in population caused
an increase in per-capita income, as the stock and productivity of land were left
unaffected. This provided rulers with a taxable surplus, which they invested in
armies and armaments, producing more war.
1 In the words of Terence, who lived in second century B.C. Rome: Quot homines, tot sententiae
(there as many opinions as there are men). https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quot%
20homines%2C%20tot%20sententiae (accessed 10 May 2020).
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Using an apocalyptic, Biblical, analogy Scheidel (2017) speaks of “four
horsemen” which have acted as the great (economic) levelers throughout history:
total war necessitating mass mobilization, state collapse, pandemics and political
revolutions.2 All of these phenomenon are in reality inter-related and endogenous
to each other. The present pandemic’s impact on wealth and income inequality is
yet to emerge, but what must be borne in mind is that in present-day production
labour is more substitutable than ever before due to artificial intelligence,
providing scope for the capital-labour ratio to rise, even though stock market and
commodity prices have plummeted, and the prospects for de-globalization loom
large.
2 Twin Crises of Capitalism: Inequality and
Populism
One of the greatest challenges of our day is the growing world-wide tide of
inequality in income and wealth (Stiglitz 2012; Piketty 2014) since about 1980. This
development has occurred against the backdrop of accelerating globalization. A
degree of inequality is acceptable to most as an outcome of incentivization
mechanisms, and as a reward to risk taking, effort and prudential decisionmaking.
The inequality thus produced is an inequality of outcome. But, high and persistent
inequality produces inequality of opportunity.3 Disadvantaged groups are unable
to advance themselves by making the right life choices and exerting effort, due to
the structural barriers presented by inequality of opportunity. Most agree that
inequality of opportunity is undesirable, even immoral, and needs redressing;
where opinions diverge is over the existence and pervasiveness of these unequal
opportunities.
The causes of inequality are well known. First, unskilled labour saving tech-
nical progress; secondly, financial globalization; thirdly, less regulated labour
markets, including informal and precarious employment. The nature of global
manufacturing production has become increasingly fragmented, with components
produced and shipped to different locations across the globe, turning nation states
into regions. Financial globalization and the greater mobility of capital contribute
to greater inequality by lowering the bargaining power of labour under the threat of
economic activities locating overseas (Furceri, Loungani, and Ostry 2017). These
2 Milanovic (2016) speaks of these as the malign forces of income equalization.
3 Discrimination, based on personal or group characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, religion,
sexual orientation can also produce inequality of opportunity.
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developments alsomean that there is a tendency for capital’s share in total product
to rise (see the evidence cited in Milanovic 2016). Piketty (2014) demonstrates the
rising ratio of the value of capital to national income in a number of countries. And,
as everyone knows the ownership of capital is much more concentrated compared
to labour income. In a global context, (Milanovic 2016, figure 1.8) demonstrates
that the share of billionaires wealth relative to global GDP was under 3% in 1987;
this had increased to more than 6% by 2013. Accompanying this, the national
income share of the middle class (defined as having an income in the range of 25%
above and 25% below median national income) declined over this time period in
nearly all Western democracies, with the United States exhibiting the lowest
middle-class share, and the UK not far behind with the fourth lowest share
(Milanovic 2016, figure 4.8).
When we come to trends in global inequality three factors come to mind. The
first relates to the famous Kuznets hypothesis that inequality first increases with
growth and then declines, as growth proceeds further. Milanovic (2016) suggests
that there may be Kuznets waves. Inequality in various industrializing and
industrialized countries first rose and then declined in the 1820–1970 period. The
peak in inequality was invariably at some point during the first epoch of global-
ization (1870–1914), and inequality tended to decline in most advanced industri-
alized economies after the First World War until about 1980. Once again, as
globalization gathered pace during its second historical phase post-1980,
inequality crept up again; this time developing countries, especially emerging
market economies, have also been participants. Thus, the two historical episodes
of increasing globalization are associated with rising inequality. Note, that as
average income rises it is theoretically feasible to have greater inequality due to the
increased distance between subsistence income and average income (Milanovic
2016).
Next, we have the concept of “global” inequality, developedmainly by Branko
Milanovic (Milanovic 2016, for example). In recent years, the greatest beneficiaries
of changes in the global income distribution have been the world’s super rich (the
top 1% in the income distribution) along with the middle classes in emerging
market economies; the greatest losers have been the lower middle and low income
groups in developed countries. Global inequality can be further decomposed to
inequality within nation states, as well as the inequality between countries based
on their average incomes. The inequality within nations has been rising every-
where, despite a short brake on inequality during the tenure of progressive regimes
in Latin America. The other component of global inequality is the inequality be-
tween nations, and here we can focus on the population differences in per-capita
income between nations. We would expect global inequality to fall as average
income in the most populous developing countries (China and India) catches up
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with rich countries, and indeed this has been the case. But when we combine the
two factors that make up global inequality, most of present-day global inequality
still continues to be attributable to between country inequality, that is the
inequality which stems from differences in average income between rich and poor
nations. How rich or poor an individual is, depends on their position in the hier-
archy of occupational incomes, but is more attributable to where they reside and
work. A bus-driver may be poor because of his disadvantaged place in the wage
league table, butmore importantly it depends onwhere he is a bus-driver (a rich or
poor country). Thus, according to Milanovic (2016) there is a citizenship rent, and
consequently a global inequality of opportunity.
Finally, rising inequality alters the political landscape moving it inexorably
towards greater plutocracy in both advanced democracies and the elected
authoritarian regimes in the developing world. This tendency has been driven, in
no small degree, by the creeping importance of money in ensuring electoral suc-
cess (Milanovic 2016, 2019). The median voter thesis of Downs (1957) whereby the
interests ofmiddle classes dominate in a democracy has been replaced by the clout
of the super rich. National policies serve to further the interests of the owners of
internationallymobile capital and skills. Thismanifests itself, chiefly, in the nation
state being obliged to follow policies of fiscal austerity andwage compression, lest
national participation in the globalized economy be jeopardized. It also frays the
domestic social contract, and leads to the diminution of social protection. By
contrast during the era of more limited globalization prior to the 1980s, the in-
terests of the rich and the median income group did not necessarily conflict; it was
an era of growing social protection, the provision of public services like education
and health, employment rights, declining inequality and consensual democracy.
Mizruchi (2013) points out that in the early post-war era (1945 to the 1970s) the
corporate elite in the United States exhibited ethical considerations of civic re-
sponsibility and enlightened self-interest, unlike at present. In short capitalism,
can be both benign or malign, depending on the epoch.
Increasing inequality in an epoch of hyper-globalization has fueled the flames
of populist politics. Here it is important to distinguish between the liberal and
electoral aspects of “democracy” (Rodrik 2017; V-DEM project 2017). A liberal
society is one where there is respect for minority rights, constraints on the exec-
utive (and legislature), with an independent judiciary, and there is respect for the
rule of law. The electoral process refers to (multi-party) electoral competition.
There is no reason to always expect liberal values to be present in an electoral
“democracy”. A purely electoral process may elect populist dictators or parties
with scant respect for liberalism. Rodrik (2018) suggests that the rise in populism
coincideswith hyper-globalization. The vote share of populist parties since 2000 in
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selected European and Latin American nations has exceeded 10% (Rodrik 2018,
figure 1).
Indeed, it can be argued that in recent elections in theUSA in 2016, the 2019UK
election and the Indian elections of 2019 the median voter resoundingly voted to
become poorer. Despite the nationalistic rhetoric, the ultimate outcome of the
policies of these elected administrations will further immiserize the already poor.
Two explanations enable the rationalization of this irrationality. The first is
cognitive dissonance. The second is to dowith the “memetic” viral spread of ideas,
leading to identity based nationalism triumphing over economic interests in the
mind of themedian voter, who iswilling to sacrifice economic interests for the sake
of nationalist identity based actions such as America First, Brexit or the pro-
scription of Muslims.
3 What Needs to be Done
As an economic system, the powerful and productive capitalistmode of production
is here to stay. In the past four decades capitalism has been creating greater
inequality. Milanovic (2019) divides the capitalist world into liberal-meritocratic
systems, as in the established old democracies in Western countries and the
“political” capitalism best exemplified by China, with autocracy as its hall mark.
The growing tide of authoritarianism in many “developmental” developing
countriesmirrors the latter image. At the present time, however, there is a degree of
convergence between the two systems due to the rising tide of corruption in “po-
litical” capitalist states, and the plutocracy in the liberal states driven by the power
of money in the electoral process.
We must resurrect the positive side of capitalism, as evidenced during its
golden age (Marglin and Schorr 1989) after the Second World War. This means
greater public spending on health, education, social protection and redistributive
policies which redress inequality, which under the present depressed circum-
stances also serve to boost output and employment for the poor.Wemust seriously
consider taxes on wealth, the possible distribution of capital to the less affluent
segments of the population, and ways of engendering greater demand for un-
skilled labour via labour augmenting technical progress. In this connection,
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) and Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides (2014) show that the
recent growth experiences of a cross-section of developed and developing coun-
tries suggest that inequality is actually harmful to growth prospects, contrary to
the receivedwisdom that inequality, by permitting the rich to save and investmore
in productive capital, oiled the wheels of growth. Also, there is now ample evi-
dence that redistributive policies, including social protection expenditures appear
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to no longer crowd-out growth prospects (Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014). In
other words the efficiency-equity trade-off (Okun 1975) no longer exists, or is very
much weaker linked to new forms of market failure and extreme inequality. We
must also consider ways of redressing the global inequality of opportunity by
permitting greater migration of unskilled workers from the global South to the
North. Novel methods of reducing conflict via buy-backs of weapons (Caruso 2020)
also merit attention.
Criticism of “hyper-globalization” emanates fromboth the liberal and populist
camps. Rodrik (2017) outlines the globalization trilemma, whereby the simulta-
neous achievement of national sovereignty, democracy and hyper-globalization is
impossible. A more diminished form of globalization such as that which prevailed
during the Bretton Woods era up to the 1970s may be desirable, with curbs on
financial flows, and the rules governing the global economy subject to the nation
state’s redistributive social contract. Populists too are wary of globalization, often
motivated by their xenophobic search for scapegoats. There is evidence of de-
globalization in the world economy (van Bergeijk 2019), highlighted by the
aggressive trade policies of the USA since the inauguration of Donald Trump as
President, and the COVID-19 pandemic is bound to disrupt global supply chains.
There is a widespread expectation of a decline in the volume of international trade
and transactions, and globalization generally. This is mainly down to hegemonic
change, and the lack of global economic leadership recently displayed under
President Trump. At present, there is a lack of international policy coordination, as
was the case via the G-20 in 2008 following the financial crisis. The success of
economic globalization hinges crucially on the ability of an economic hegemon
(UK and the USA) providing leadership, policy coordination and being a lender of
the last resort to prevent economic collapse. This does not seem forthcoming from
the United States at present, and China seems still not ready to step into the global
economic leadership shoes. But wemust not allow de-globalization to proceed too
far, so as to retain some positive features of the earlier liberal-internationalist order
(Gleditsch 2008; Ikenberry 2018), which also coincided with the golden age of
capitalism.
More than ever, the present crisis should serve to remind us that inequality is
the mother of all forms of conflict, which demands amelioration.
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